Secure Broadcasting by Khisti, Ashish et al.
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
70
20
93
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
16
 Fe
b 2
00
7
1
Secure Broadcasting
Ashish Khisti, Student Member, IEEE, Aslan Tchamkerten,
and Gregory W. Wornell, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract
Wyner’s wiretap channel is extended to parallel broadcast channels and fading channels with multiple receivers.
In the first part of the paper, we consider the setup of parallel broadcast channels with one sender, multiple intended
receivers, and one eavesdropper. We study the situations where the sender broadcasts either a common message
or independent messages to the intended receivers. We derive upper and lower bounds on the common-message-
secrecy capacity, which coincide when the users are reversely degraded. For the case of independent messages we
establish the secrecy sum-capacity when the users are reversely degraded.
In the second part of the paper we apply our results to fading channels: perfect channel state information of
all intended receivers is known globally, whereas the eavesdropper channel is known only to her. For the common
message case, a somewhat surprising result is proven: a positive rate can be achieved independently of the number
of intended receivers. For independent messages, an opportunistic transmission scheme is presented that achieves
the secrecy sum-capacity in the limit of large number of receivers. Our results are stated for a fast fading channel
model. Extensions to the block fading model are also discussed.
Index Terms
Wiretap channel, information theoretic secrecy, confidential messages, parallel channels, fading channels,
multiuser diversity, multicasting
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of emerging applications require a “key distribution mechanism” to selectively broadcast
confidential messages to intended receivers. For example in pay TV systems, a content provider wishes to
selectively broadcast a certain program to a subset of customers who have subscribed to it. An online key
distribution mechanism would allow the service provider to distribute a decryption key to these intended
receivers while securing it from potential eavesdroppers. The program could then be encrypted via standard
cryptographic protocols, so that only users who have access to the decryption key could view it. Indeed, in
the absence of such a mechanism, current solutions rely on variants of traditional public key cryptography
(see, e.g., [5]) and are vulnerable to attacks such as piracy [7].
An information theoretic framework for perfect secrecy was developed by Shannon [18], and the problem
of broadcasting confidential messages was originally formulated by Wyner [22]. Wyner considered a
special broadcast channel (also known as the wiretap channel): one sender, an intended receiver, and one
eavesdropper. He characterized the tradeoff between the rate to the intended receiver and the equivocation
at the eavesdropper when the eavesdropper has a degraded channel compared to the intended receiver. This
formulation has been generalized for non-degraded broadcast channels in [3], and applied to Gaussian
channels in [13].
While the results for wire-tap channels are rather surprising in that they show that it is possible to
achieve a positive rate while keeping the eavesdropper in near-perfect equivocation, they also provide some
disappointing facts for degraded channels, such as Gaussian [13]. First, the secrecy capacity is positive
only if the eavesdropper is noisier than the intended receiver. This may not be the case in practice. Second,
in the limit of high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), the secrecy capacity approaches a constant and does not
exhibit a logarithmic growth with power. Thus, physical layer secrecy comes at a price in throughput
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2and this may have prompted many practical cryptographic solutions to be based upon other notions of
security, such as computational security [5]. Note, however, that such solutions require an off-line key
distribution mechanism which may not be practical in emerging applications.
The wiretap channel has received renewed interest in some recent works that consider a wireless envi-
ronment. There the eavesdropper is not always stronger than the intended receivers due to time variations
in channel gains. These variations in turn can be exploited to communicate securely by transmitting to
the receivers that have a strong channel. Such coding strategies may yield a practical approach for secure
communication without an off-line key agreement.
In the present work we extend Wyner’s wiretap channel to parallel broadcast channels with one sender,
multiple intended receivers, and one eavesdropper. We consider two situations: all intended receivers get
a common message or independent messages. We first derive upper and lower bounds on the common-
message-secrecy-capacity. These bounds coincide when the users are reversely degraded. Perhaps the
main observation is that, to achieve the common message capacity, independent codebooks are used on
each parallel channel, and each receiver jointly decodes its received sequences. Next, we consider the case
where the intended receivers get independent messages. We establish the secrecy capacity for the reversely
degraded case. The achievable scheme is simple: transmit to the strongest user on each parallel channel
and use independent codebooks across the channels. Our results for the parallel broadcast channels can
be viewed as generalizations of the results in [6] which considers a similar setup without the presence of
an eavesdropper.
Our study on parallel channels provides insights to the problem of broadcasting confidential messages
over fading channels. In the second part of the paper we consider an i.i.d. fading model. We assume the
intended receivers’ channel state information (CSI) is revealed to all communicating parties (including
the eavesdropper), while the eavesdropper’s channel gains are revealed only to her.
We first examine the case when a common message needs to be delivered to all intended receivers in
the presence of potential eavesdroppers. We refer to this problem as secure multicasting. We present a
scheme that exploits CSI at the transmitter and achieves a rate that does not decay to zero with increasing
number of receivers. Note that, without a secrecy constraint, transmitter CSI appears to be of little value
for multicasting over ergodic channels. Indeed the capacity appears to be not too far from the maximum
achievable rate with a flat power allocation scheme. The secrecy constraint adds a new twist to the
multicasting problem as it requires to consider protocols that exploit transmitter CSI.
For the case of independent messages, we consider an opportunistic scheme that selects the user with
the strongest channel at each time. We use Gaussian wiretap codebooks for each intended receiver and
show that this scheme achieves the sum capacity in the limit of large number of receivers. Our results can
be interpreted as the wiretap analog of the multiuser diversity results in settings without secrecy constraint
(see, e.g., [20]).
In related works, the Gaussian wiretap channel was extended to parallel channels in [23]. More recently,
the case of discrete memoryless parallel channels with one receiver and one eavesdropper has been studied
in [15], [16]. The wiretap setting has been also studied for fading channels in [1], [10], [17]. All these
works consider the setup of one sender, one receiver, and one eavesdropper.
There is also a vast literature on multiuser diversity in broadcast channels with independent messages
starting from the results in [14], [19]. However, to the best of our knowledge, the present work is the first to
consider the impact of multiuser diversity on secrecy systems. As discussed before, the case of a common
message has received much less attention in the literature. The problem of transmitting a common message
on parallel channels has been studied in [6], [11] but we are not aware of a general treatment of this problem
for fading channels (without an eavesdropper). We hope that the secrecy constraint creates renewed interest
in the study of common message broadcast problems, given its application to key distribution.
We use the following notation. Upper case letters are used for random variables and the lower case for
their realizations. The notation sn denotes a vector of length n. Vector quantities related to the eavesdropper
have a subscript e, e.g., yne , while the ones of the intended receivers are subscripted by the user number,
e.g., yni . We use the subscript i to index the receivers and the subscript j to index the channels. We use
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Fig. 1. An example of reversely degraded parallel channel in Definition 2 with one sender, K = 2 users, one eavesdropper, and M = 3
channels.
the letter t to denote the discrete time index. If there is an ordering of users on a given channel, the
strongest user on channel j will be denoted by pij . The set of ordered users on channel j is denoted as
pij(1), pij(2), . . . We use the notation p(Xj) to denote the probability mass function of random variable
Xj .
II. PARALLEL CHANNELS: MODEL
In our setup, there are M parallel channels for communication, one sender, K intended receivers, and
one eavesdropper.
Definition 1 (Product Broadcast Channel): An (M,K) product broadcast channel consists of one sender,
K receivers, one eavesdropper, and M channels. The channels have finite input and output alphabets, are
memoryless and independent of each other, and are characterized by their transition probabilities given
by
Pr
({yn1j, yn2j, . . . , ynKj, ynej}j=1,...,M | {xnj }j=1,...M) = M∏
j=1
n∏
t=1
Pr(y1j(t), y2j(t), . . . , yKj(t), yej(t) | xj(t))
(1)
for j = 1, 2, . . . ,M , where xnj = xj(1), xj(2), . . . , xj(n) denotes the sequence of symbols transmitted
on channel j, and where ynij = yij(1), yij(2), . . . , yij(n) denotes the sequence of symbols received by
user i on channel j from time 1 up to n. The alphabets of the Xj’s and Yij’s are denoted by X and Y
respectively.
Of particular interest is a special class of reversely degraded broadcast channels.
Definition 2 (Reversely Degraded Broadcast Channel): An (M,K) reversely degraded broadcast chan-
nel is an (M,K) product broadcast channel, where each of the M parallel channels is degraded in a certain
order. For some permutation pij(1), pij(2), . . . pij(K +1) of the set {1, 2, . . . , K, e} of the K +1-receivers,
a Markov chain Xj → Ypij(1) → Ypij(2) → . . .→ Ypij(K+1) can be specified.
Remark 1: Note that in Definition 2 the order of degradation can be different across the channels, so
the overall channel may not be degraded. An example of reversely degraded parallel channel is shown
in Fig 1. Also, on any parallel channels component, the K users and the eavesdropper are physically
degraded. Our capacity results will, however, only depend on the marginal distribution of receivers on
each channel (see Fact 1 below). Accordingly, these results also hold for a larger class of channels where
receivers on each channel are stochastically degraded.
III. PARALLEL CHANNELS: COMMON MESSAGE
In this section we consider the case where all the receivers are interested in only a common message.
This common message must be protected from the eavesdropper in the sense described below.
Definition 3: A (n, 2nR) code consists of a message set W = {1, 2, . . . 2nR}, a (possibly stochastic)
mapping ωn : W → X n ×X n × . . .× X n︸ ︷︷ ︸
M times
from the message set to the codewords for the M channels,
and a decoder Φi,n : Yn ×Yn × . . . . . . . . .× Yn︸ ︷︷ ︸
M times
→W for i = 1, 2, . . .K at each receiver. We denote the
4message estimate at decoder i by Wˆi. A common-message-secrecy-rate R is achievable if, for any ε > 0,
there exists a length n code such that Pr(W 6= Wˆi) ≤ ε for i = 1, 2, . . .K, while
1
n
H(W |Y ne1, Y ne2, . . . , Y neK) ≥ R− ε. (2)
The common-message-secrecy-capacity is the supremum over all achievable rates.
Remark 2: Wyner’s formulation considers the rate-equivocation region (R,Re) with 1nH(W ) ≥ R and
1
n
H(W |Y ne ) ≥ Re. The secrecy-capacity constitutes the special case when R = Re. In the key-distribution
application of interest, the key length is limited by the equivocation rate Re — the minimum number
of bits the eavesdropper needs to guess to decode the message. Accordingly, the secrecy capacity is of
primary interest.
A. Main Results
Our main result is the characterization of upper and lower bounds on the common-message-secrecy-
capacity for the product channel model (1). The bounds coincide for the reversely degraded model.
To state our upper bound we introduce the following additional notation. For any j = 1, 2, . . . ,M ,
let Pj denote the collection of all joint distributions p′(Y1j , Y2j, . . . YKj, Yej|Xj) with the same marginal
marginal distribution as p(Y1j |Xj), p(Y2j|Xj), . . . , p(YKj|Xj), p(Yej|Xj). Let P = P1 × P2 × . . . × PM
denote the cartesian product of these sets across the channels.
Lemma 1 (Upper Bound): For the product broadcast channel model in Definition 1, an upper bound
on the secrecy capacity is given by
R+,commonK,M
∆
= min
P
maxQM
j=1 p(Xj)
min
i∈{1,2,...,K}
M∑
j=1
I(Xj ; Yij|Yej) (3)
where the first minimum is over all the joint distributions
{p′(Y1j, Y2j, . . . YKj, Yej|Xj)}Mj=1 ∈ P.
Lemma 2 (Lower Bound): An achievable common-message-secrecy-rate for the product broadcast chan-
nel model Definition 1 is1
R−,commonK,M
∆
= maxQM
j=1 p(Uj)
{Xj=fj(Uj)}j=1,...,M
min
i∈{1,2,...,K}
M∑
j=1
{I(Uj; Yij)− I(Uj ; Yej)}+ . (4)
The random variables U1, U2, . . . UM are independent over some alphabet U , and each fj : U → X ,
j = 1, . . . ,M is a (possibly stochastic2) mapping from the U to X .
Our upper and lower bounds coincide for the case of reversely degraded product channels.
Theorem 1: The common-message-secrecy-capacity for the reversely degraded channel model in Def-
inition 2 is given by
CcommonK,M = maxQM
j=1 p(Xj)
min
i∈{1,2,...,K}
M∑
j=1
I(Xj; Yij|Yej) . (5)
Note that the expression in (5) is evaluated for the joint distribution induced by the reversely degraded
channel. This distribution is the worst-case distribution in the set P in (3).
Remark 3: Our achievable rate expression in (4) involves optimization over the auxiliary random
variables Uj and the stochastic mappings fj(·). As noted in [3], the expression I(Uj ; Yij)− I(Uj ; Yej) is
in general not convex in p(Xj|Uj), hence the optimal fj(·) need not be deterministic functions. However,
for the special reversely degraded case in Theorem 1, the choice Xj = Uj is optimal (see Section III-D).
1{v}+ stands for max{0, v}.
2For each u ∈ Uj , a stochastic mapping fj : U → X produces a random element in X .
5The proof of the upper bound in Lemma 1 is a rather straightforward extension of Wyner’s converse for
the single user wiretap channel. The achievability proof in Lemma 2 is more interesting. When specialized
to the case of no eavesdropper, it provides a different capacity achieving scheme than the one considered
in [6].
B. Upper Bound
Fact 1: The common-message-secrecy-capacity for the wiretap channel depends only on the marginal
distributions p(Y1j|Xj), p(Y2j|Xj), . . . , p(YKj|Xj) in (1) and not on the joint distribution p(Y1j, Y2j, . . . , YKj|Xj)
for each j = 1, 2, . . . ,M .
The proof of this fact is essentially the same as the proof for broadcast channels without secrecy constraint
(see, e.g., [3]).
The following property will be used in the upper bound derivation but, also, in other subsequent proofs.
Fact 2: For any random variables X , Y , and Z the quantity I(X ; Y |Z) is concave in p(X).
The proof is implicit in the arguments in [21]. We provide it in Appendix I for completeness.
Suppose there exists a sequence of (n, 2nR) codes such that, for every ε > 0, as n→∞
Pr(W 6= Wˆi) ≤ ε, i = 1, 2, . . .K
1
n
I(W ; Y ne1, . . . , Y
n
eM) ≤ ε.
(6)
We first note that from Fano’s Lemma we have
1
n
H(W |Y ni1, Y ni2 , . . . , Y niM) ≤
1
n
+ εR i = 1, 2, . . .K. (7)
Combining (6) and (7) we have, for all i = 1, 2, . . .K and ε′ = ε+ 1
n
+ εR,
nR ≤ I(W ; Y ni1, . . . , Y niM)− I(W ; Y ne1, . . . , Y neM) + nε′
≤ I(W ; Y ni1, . . . , Y niM |Y ne1, . . . , Y neM) + nε′
= h(Y ni1 , . . . , Y
n
iM |Y ne1, . . . , Y neM)− h(Y ni1 , . . . , Y niM |Y ne1, . . . , Y neM ,W )
≤ h(Y ni1 , . . . , Y niM |Y ne1, . . . , Y neM)− h(Y ni1 , . . . , Y niM |Y ne1, . . . , Y neM , Xn1 , . . . , XnM ,W )
= h(Y ni1 , . . . , Y
n
iM |Y ne1, . . . , Y neM)− h(Y ni1 , . . . , Y niM |Y ne1, . . . , Y neM , Xn1 , . . . , XnM) (8)
= h(Y ni1 , . . . , Y
n
iM |Y ne1, . . . , Y neM)−
M∑
j=1
h(Y nij |Xnj , Y nej) + nε′ (9)
≤
M∑
j=1
h(Y nij |Yejn)−
M∑
j=1
h(Y nij |Xnj , Y nej) + nε′
≤
M∑
j=1
I(Xnj ; Y
n
ij |Y nej) + nε′, (10)
where (8) follows from the fact that W → (Xn1 , . . .XnM , Y ne1, . . . , Y neM)→ (Y ni1 , . . . , Y niM) form a Markov
chain, and (9) holds because the parallel channels are mutually independent in (1) so that
h(Y ni1 , . . . , Y
n
iM |Y ne1, . . . , Y neM , Xn1 , . . . , XnM) =
M∑
j=1
h(Y nij |Xnj , Y nej) .
6We now upper bound each term in the summation (10). We have
I(Xnj ; Y
n
ij |Y nej) ≤
n∑
k=1
I(Xj(k); Yij(k)|Yej(k)) (11)
=
n∑
k=1
I(Xj(k); Yij(k), Yej(k))− I(Xj(k); Yej(k)) (12)
= nI(Xj; Yij, Yej|Q)− nI(Xj ; Yej|Q) (13)
= nI(Xj; Yij|Yej, Q)
≤ nI(Xj ; Yij|Yej), (14)
where (11) follows from the fact that the channel is memoryless,and (13) is obtained by defining Q to
be a (time-sharing) random variable uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , n} independent of everything
else. The random variables (Xj , Yij, Yej) are such that, conditioned on Q = k, they have the same joint
distribution as (Xj(k), Yij(k), Yej(k)). Finally (14) follows from the fact that the mutual information is
concave with respect to the input distribution p(Xj) as stated in Fact 2.
Combining (14) and (9) we have
R ≤
M∑
j=1
I(Xj ; Yij|Yej) + ε′, i = 1, 2, . . .K
= min
1≤i≤K
M∑
j=1
I(Xj; Yij|Yej) + ε′ (15)
≤ maxQM
j=1 p(Xj)
min
1≤i≤K
M∑
j=1
I(Xj; Yij|Yej) + ε′ . (16)
The above bound (16) depends on the joint distribution across the channels. Accordingly, we tighten
the upper bound by considering the worst distribution in P = P1 ×P2 × . . .× PM which gives
R ≤ min
P
maxQM
j=1 p(Xj)
min
1≤i≤K
M∑
j=1
I(Xj ; Yij|Yej) + ε′ . (17)
C. Lower Bound
We first informally present the main ideas in our achievability scheme. We construct M independent
codebooks, one for each channel, denoted as C1, C2, . . . , CM . The structure of the codebooks is shown
in Fig. 2. Each Cj has 2n(R+I(Uj ;Yej)) codewords, randomly partitioned into 2nR message bins — there
are 2nI(Uj ;Yej) codewords per bin. Given a message W , the encoder selects M codewords as follows. On
channel j, it looks into the bin corresponding to message W in Cj and randomly selects a codeword
in this bin. Each intended receiver attempts to find a message that is jointly typical with its received
sequences. An appropriate choice of R guarantees successful decoding with high probability for each
intended receiver, and near perfect equivocation at the eavesdropper.
We now provide a formal description of our coding scheme.
Fix the distributions p(U1), p(U2), . . . , p(UM) and the (possibly stochastic) functions f1(·), . . . , fM(·).
Let εE and εR be positive constants, to be quantified later. With respect to these quantities, define
R = min
1≤i≤K
M∑
j=1
{I(Uj; Yij)− I(Uj ; Yej)}+ − εR
Rej = I(Uj ; Yej)− εF , j = 1, 2, . . .M.
(18)
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Fig. 2. Structure of the codebooks in our coding scheme for the case of two parallel channels. Each codebook has 2nR message bins
and Qj ≈ 2n(I(Uj ;Yej)) codewords per message bin. Thus the size of bins depends on the mutual information of the eavesdropper on the
corresponding channel. This flexible binning enables to confuse the eavesdropper on each channel. Note that C1 and C2 above have the same
number of rows but different number of columns. The codewords for message wk in Cj are labeled as unj1(wk), . . . unjQj (wk)
.
In what follows, whenever typicality is mentioned it is intended to be ε−weak typicality (see, e.g., [2]).
The set T (Uj) denotes the set of all sequences that are typical with respect to distribution p(Uj) and
the set T (Xj, Uj) denotes the set of all jointly typical sequences (xnj , unj ) with respect to the distribution
p(Xj, Uj). Tunj (Xj|Uj) denotes the set of all sequences xnj conditionally typical with respect to a given
sequence unj according to p(Xj |Uj).
1) Codebook Generation:
• Codebook Cj for j = 1, 2, . . . ,M has a total of Mj = 2n(R+Rej) length n codeword sequences. Each
sequence is selected uniformly and independently from the set T (Uj).
• We randomly partition the Mj sequences into 2nR message bins so that there are Qj = 2nRej
codewords per bin.
• The set of codewords associated with bin w in codebook Cj is denoted as
Cj(w) = {unj1(w), unj2(w), . . . , unjQj(w), }, w = 1, 2, . . . 2nR, j = 1, 2, . . .M. (19)
Note that Cj =
⋃2nR
w=1 Cj(w) is the codebook on channel j.
2) Encoding: To encode message w, the encoder randomly and uniformly selects a codeword in the
set Cj(w) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ M . Specifically,
• Select M integers k1, k2, . . . , kM , where kj is selected independently and uniformly from the set
{1, 2, . . .Qj}.
• Given a message w, select a codeword unjkj(w) from codebook Cj(w) for j = 1, 2, . . .M .
• The transmitted sequence on channel j is denoted by xnj = xj(1), xj(2), . . . , xj(n). The symbol xj(t)
is obtained by applying the (possibly stochastic) function fj(·) on the tth element of the codeword
unjkj(w).
3) Decoding: Receiver i, based on its observations (yni1, yni2, . . . , yniM) from the M parallel channels,
declares message w according to the following rule.
• Let Si = {j|1 ≤ j ≤ M, I(Uj; Yij) > I(Uj ; Yej)} denote the set of channels where receiver i has
larger mutual information than the eavesdropper. The receiver only considers the outputs ynij from
these channels.
• Receiver i searches for a message w such that, for each j ∈ Si, there is an index lj such that
(unjlj(w), y
n
ij) ∈ T (Uj, Yij). If a unique w has this property, the receiver declares it as the transmitted
message. Otherwise, the receiver declares an arbitrary message.
84) Error Probability: We show that, averaged over the ensemble of codebooks, the error probability
is smaller than a constant ε′ (to be specified), which approaches zero as n→ ∞. This demonstrates the
existence of a codebook with error probability less than ε′. We do the analysis for user i and, without
loss of generality, assume that message w1 is transmitted.
• False Reject Event: Let E c1j be the event {(Unjkj(w1), Y nij ) /∈ T (Uj, Yij)}. Since Unj ∈ T (Uj) by
construction and Yij is obtained by passing Uj through a DMC, it follows that Pr(E c1j) ≤ δ, where
δ → 0 as ε→ 0. Accordingly if E c1 denotes the event that message w1 does not appear typical, then
we have
Pr(E c1) = Pr
(
M⋃
j=1
E c1j
)
≤Mδ. (20)
• False Accept Event: As before, let Si ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,M} denote the subset of channels for which
I(Uj; Yij) > I(Uj ; Yej). In what follows the index j will only refer to channels in Si.
Let Erj denote the event that there is a codeword in the set Cj(wr) (r > 1) typical with Y nij . Also let
Er be the event that message wr has a codeword typical on every channel.
Pr(Erj) = Pr(∃l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Qj} : (Unjl(wr), Y nij ) ∈ T (Uj , Yij)), j ∈ S
≤
Qj∑
l=1
Pr((Unjl(wr), Y
n
ij ) ∈ T (Uj, Yij))
≤
Qj∑
l=1
2−n(I(Uj ;Yij)−3δ)
≤ 2−n(I(Uj ;Yij)−I(Uj ;Yej)−3δ+εF ),
where the last inequality follows since Qj = 2n(I(Uj ;Yej)−εF ). Finally, the probability of Er can be
computed as
Pr(Er) = Pr(
⋂
j∈Si
Erj)
=
∏
j∈Si
Pr(Erj) (21)
= 2−n
P
j∈Si
(I(Uj ;Yij)−I(Uj ;Yej)−3ε+εF )
= 2−n
PM
j=1({I(Uj ;Yij)−I(Uj ;Yej)}
+−3ε+εF ),
where (21) follows by independence of codebooks and channels. The probability of false accept event
EF is then given by
Pr(EF ) = Pr(
2nR⋃
r=2
Er)
≤ 2nR2−n
PM
j=1({I(Uj ;Yij)−I(Uj ;Yej)}
+−3δ+εF )
≤ 2−n(3Mδ−MεF+εR),
which vanishes with increasing n for any εR and εF that satisfy the relation εR > MεF − 3Mδ > 0.
The probability of error averaged over the ensemble of codebooks is less than
ε′ = max
(
Mδ, 2−n(3Mδ−MεF+εR)
)
. This demonstrates the existence of a codebook with error proba-
bility less than ε′.
95) Secrecy Analysis: We now bound the equivocation at the eavesdropper for a typical code in the
ensemble. Informally, since the codebook Cj has 2n(I(Uj ;Yej)−εF ) codewords per bin, the eavesdropper’s
equivocation is near perfect when observing the output of channel j, i.e., 1
n
I(W ; Y nej) ≤ ε′F for some ε′F
(to be specified) such that ε′F → 0 as εF → 0. Since we are sending the same message on each of the
M channels, the eavesdropper can potentially reduce the equivocation by combining the channel outputs.
However in doing so, his equivocation reduces by at most Mε′F since the codewords on each channel are
independently selected.3
The following Lemma is proved in Appendix II.
Lemma 3: A typical code from the ensemble in our achievability scheme satisfies the following: For
any j = 1, 2, . . .M , we have 1
n
I(W ; Y nej) ≤ ε′F , where ε′F = ε′F (δ, εF ) tends to zero as δ → 0 and εF → 0.
Using the above lemma we now upper bound the mutual information at the eavesdropper as
1
n
I(W ; Y ne1, . . . , Y
n
eM) = h(Y
n
e1, . . . , Y
n
eM)− h(Y ne1, . . . , Y neM |W ) (22)
= h(Y ne1, . . . , Y
n
eM)−
m∑
j=1
h(Y nej|W ) (23)
≤
M∑
j=1
I(W ; Y nej) ≤Mnε′F , (24)
where h(Y ne1, . . . , Y neM |W ) =
∑m
j=1 h(Y
n
ej|W ) since the codewords in the sets C1(W ), C2(W ), . . . , CM(W )
are independently selected.
Hence the normalized mutual information increases only by a fixed amount due to observations on
multiple channels. By choosing ε in (2) to equal Mε′F , we satisfy the secrecy constraint.
D. Capacity Result of Theorem 1
The result of Theorem 1 follows directly from Lemma 1 and 2. For the reversely degraded broadcast
channel we have, for all i and j, that either Xj → Yij → Yej or Xj → Yej → Yij holds. If Xj → Yij → Yej
holds, then
I(Xj; Yij)− I(Xj; Yej) = I(Xj; Yij, Yej)− I(Xj; Yej)
= I(Xj; Yij|Yej).
Instead, if Xj → Yej → Yij , then I(Xj; Yij|Yej) = 0. In either case we can write I(Xj; Yij|Yej) =
{I(Xj; Yij)− I(Xj; Yej)}+. Substituting this in (3) we have
R+,commonK,M ≤ max
p(X1)p(X2)...p(XM )
min
i∈{1,2,...,K}
M∑
j=1
{I(Xj; Yij)− I(Xj; Yej)}+, (25)
which coincides with our achievable rate in (4) when we choose Uj = Xj .
As a special case of Theorem 1, we have the following corollary for the case of one receiver and one
eavesdropper.
Corollary 1 (Single User case): Consider the reversely degraded parallel channels in Definition 2 with
one receiver and one eavesdropper. The secrecy capacity is given by
C1,M = max
p(X1)p(X2)...p(XM )
M∑
j=1
I(Xj; Yj|Yej) . (26)
3It is important that the codewords be independently selected. If they are not, say the same codeword is repeated on each channel, the
eavesdropper equivocation can be significantly reduced by combining the channel outputs.
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Fig. 3. Two coding schemes for common message transmission on proposed channels. The top figure shows the scheme proposed in
Theorem 1. It achieves the common message capacity. In this scheme we use independent codebooks on each parallel channel. This allows
us to separately bin on each channel. The lower figure shows the scheme that uses a single codebook. While this scheme is optimal when
there is no eavesdropper [6], it is suboptimal in our setup. This drawback of this scheme is that because of the single codebook, one cannot
separately bin for each channel.
Remark 4: The single user result admits a simple coding scheme. Split the message W into M sub-
messages W1,W2, . . . ,WM and independently encode and decode message Wj on channel j with a
codebook of rate Rj = I(Xj; Yj|Yej). With multiple receivers however, this simple scheme is limited
by the worst user on each parallel channel and does not achieve the secrecy capacity.
E. Sub-optimality of a Single Codebook scheme
The capacity of common message for reversely degraded broadcast channels in Definition 2 without
the secrecy constraint is [6]
CNo SecrecyK,M = maxQM
j=1 p(Xj)
min
i∈{1,2,...,K}
M∑
j=1
I(Xj; Yij). (27)
The achievability scheme in (27) uses a single codebook with codewords of dimension M × n. The
jth component of the codeword is a length n sequence sampled from an i.i.d. p(Xj) distribution and is
transmitted on channel j.
Our achievable scheme is different from this single codebook scheme since we use independent code-
books on each parallel channel. Note that this distinction is important in achieving the secrecy capacity
in Theorem 1. The distinction between these schemes is shown in Fig. 3. An achievable rate using the
single-codebook scheme in our setup is
Rsingle = max
p(X1,X2,...,XM )
min
i∈{1,2,...K}
{I(X1, X2 . . . XK ; Yi1, . . . YiK)− I(X1, X2 . . .XK ; Ye1, . . . YeK)} . (28)
Note that, in general, the rate (28) is smaller than (5).4 The intuition behind this is that, by using
an independent codebook on each parallel channel, it is possibly to separately tune the bin size on
each channel according to the degradation of the eavesdropper. Finally note that our proposed scheme
also provides an alternative way to [6] to achieve the common message capacity in the absence of an
eavesdropper.
4The two expressions coincide if, for example, the eavesdropper is degraded with respect to all the receivers on all the channels, i.e.,
Xj → Yij → Yej for every 1 ≤ i ≤ K and 1 ≤ j ≤M .
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F. Gaussian Channels
We consider the Gaussian channel model where
Yij = Xj + Zij
Yej = Xj + Zej,
(29)
with Zij ∼ N (0, σ2ij) and Zej ∼ N (0, σ2ej). All these noise variables are assumed independent. We also
impose an average power constraint E[
∑M
j=1X
2
j ] ≤ P .
Corollary 2: The common-message-secrecy-capacity for the Gaussian parallel broadcast channel in (29)
is
Ccommon,GaussianK,M = max
(P1,P2,...PM )∈F
min
1≤i≤K
M∑
j=1
{
1
2
log
(
1 +
Pj
σ2ij
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
Pj
σ2ej
)}+
, (30)
where F is the set of all feasible power allocations that satisfy ∑Mj=1 Pj ≤ P .
To prove Corollary 2, first observe that the channel in (29) has the same capacity as the corresponding
reversely degraded broadcast channel (see Fact 1) given by the following model: on channel j, let
pij(1), . . . , pij(K + 1) denote set of intended receivers and eavesdropper ordered from the strongest to
the weakest. For each 0 ≤ k ≤ K, the channel for user pij(k + 1) is Yˆpij(k+1)j = Yˆpij(k)j + Zˆkj with
Ypij(0)j
∆
= Xj and σ2pi(0)j
∆
= 0. The noise random variables Zˆkj ∼ N (0, σ2pi(k+1)j − σ2pi(k)j) are independent.
Since I(Xj; Yˆij|Yˆej) is a continuous and concave function in p(X) (see Fact 2), we use discretization
arguments (see, e.g., Ch. 7 in [8]) to extend Theorem 1 to the Gaussian case
CcommonK,M (P ) = maxQM
j=1 p(Xj),
E[
PM
j=1X
2
j ]≤P
min
i∈{1,2,...,K}
M∑
j=1
I(Xj; Yˆij|Yˆej) . (31)
Now observe that maxp(Xj),E[X2j ]≤Pj I(Xj; Yˆij|Yˆej) denotes the capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel [13].
Accordingly we have
max
p(Xj),E[X2j ]≤Pj
I(Xj; Yˆij|Yˆej) =
{
1
2
log
(
1 +
Pj
σ2ij
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
Pj
σ2ej
)}+
. (32)
One then deduces (30).
IV. PARALLEL CHANNELS: INDEPENDENT MESSAGES
We consider the case of M parallel channels, one eavesdropper and K receivers, each interested in an
independent message. Each such message must be protected from the eavesdropper. We now define the
achievable rate for the case of independent messages.
Definition 4 (Length n Code): A (2nR1, 2nR2, . . . , 2nRK , n) code for the product broadcast wiretap chan-
nel in Definition 1 consists of a mapping ωn :W1×W2×. . .×WK → X n × X n . . .X n︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mtimes
from the messages
of the K users to the M channel inputs and K decoding functions φi,n : Yn ×Yn × . . .× Yn︸ ︷︷ ︸
M times
→Wi, one
at each intended receiver. We denote the message estimate at decoder i by Wˆi. A perfect-secrecy-rate tuple
(R1, R2, . . . , RK) is achievable if, for every ε > 0, there is a length n code such that Pr(Wi 6= Wˆi) ≤ ε
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , K, and such that the following condition is satisfied
1
n
H(Wi|W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . .WK , Y ne1, . . . Y neM) ≥
1
n
H(W )− ε, i = 1, 2, . . .M. (33)
The secrecy-sum-capacity CsumK,M is the supremum of R1 +R2 + . . .+RK over the achievable rate tuples
(R1, R2, . . . , RK).
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Remark 5: Our constraint (33) provides perfect equivocation for each message, even if all the other
messages are revealed to the eavesdropper. It may be possible to increase the secrecy rate by exploiting
the fact that the eavesdropper does not have access to other messages. This is not considered in the present
paper.
A. Main Results
Our main result is an expression for the secrecy-sum-capacity for the reversely degraded broadcast
channel in Definition 2.
Theorem 2: Let pij denote the strongest user on channel j. The secrecy-sum-capacity for the reversely
broadcast channel is given by
CsumK,M = max
p(X1)p(X2)...p(XM )
M∑
j=1
I(Xj; Ypij |Yej). (34)
Furthermore, the expression in (34) is an upper bound on the secrecy-sum-capacity when only the intended
users are reversely degraded — but the set of receivers together with the eavesdropper is not degraded.
The remainder of this section will be devoted to the proof of Theorem 2 and some discussion.
B. Proof of Upper Bound in Theorem 2
We establish the upper bound in Theorem 2. Suppose a genie provides the output of the strongest
receiver, pij , to all other receivers on each channel, i.e., on channel j the output Y npij is made available to
all the receivers. Because of degradation, we may assume, without loss of generality, that each receiver
only observes (Y npi1, . . . , Y
n
piM
). Clearly, such a genie aided channel can only have a sum capacity larger
than the original channel. Since all receivers are identical, to compute the sum capacity it suffices to
consider the situation with one sender, one receiver, and one eavesdropper.
Lemma 4: The secrecy-sum-capacity in Theorem 2 is upper bounded by the secrecy capacity of the
genie aided channel, i.e., CsumK,M ≤ CGenieAided.
Proof: Suppose that a secrecy rate point (R1, R2, . . . RK) is achievable for the K user channel in
Theorem 2 and let the messages be denoted as (W1,W2, . . .WK). This implies that, for any ε > 0 and n
large enough, there is a length n code such that Pr(Wˆi 6= Wi) ≤ ε for i = 1, 2, . . . , K, and such that
1
n
H(Wi|W1, . . .Wi−1,Wi+1, . . .WK , Y ne1, Y ne2, . . . , Y neM) ≥ Ri − ε . (35)
We now show that a rate of (
∑K
i=1Ri, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−1
) is achievable on the genie aided channel. First, note
that any message that is correctly decoded on the original channel is also correctly decoded by user 1
on the genie aided channel. It remains to bound the equivocation on the genie aided channel when the
message to receiver 1 is W = (W1,W2, . . . ,WK). We have
1
n
H(W |Y ne1, Y ne2, . . . , Y neM) =
1
n
H(W1,W2, . . . ,WK |Y ne1, Y ne2, . . . , Y neM)
≥
K∑
i=1
1
n
H(Wi|W1, . . .Wi−1,Wi+1, . . .WK , Y ne1, Y ne2, . . . , Y neM)
≥
K∑
i=1
Ri −Kε
where the last step follows from (35). Since ε is arbitrary, this establishes the claim.
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Lemma 5: The secrecy capacity of the genie aided channel is
CGenieAided = max
p(X1)p(X2)...p(XM )
M∑
j=1
I(Xj ; Ypij |Yej). (36)
Proof: Since all receivers are identical on the genie aided channel, this Lemma is a direct consequence
of Corollary 1 when specialized to the case of K = 1 receiver.
Remark 6: The upper bound continues to hold even if the eavesdroppers channel is not ordered with
respect to the intended receivers. In general, following Lemma 1, the upper bound can be tightened by
considering, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ M , the worst joint distribution p′(Ypij , Yej|Xj) among all joint distributions
with the same marginal distribution as p(Ypij |Xj) and p(Yej|Xj), yielding
CsumK,M ≤ minQM
j=1 p
′(Ypij ,Yej |Xj)
maxQM
j=1 p(Xj)
M∑
j=1
I(Xj ; Ypij |Yej). (37)
C. Achievability Scheme
Our achievability scheme for Theorem 2 requires the receivers and the eavesdropper to be reversely
degraded. We only send information intended to the strongest user, i.e., only user pij on channel j can
decode. It follows from the result of the wiretap channel [22] that a rate of Rj = maxp(Xj) I(Xj; Ypij |Yej)
is achievable on channel j. Accordingly the total sum rate of
∑
j Rj is achievable which is the capacity
expression.
Remark 7: The “opportunistic transmission” strategy in Theorem 2 has been previously observed in
the absence of an eavesdropper [14], [19] in the context of fading channels. Hence our result states that
the optimality of opportunistic transmission also holds in the presence of an eavesdropper. Our converse
technique, when applied to the case of no eavesdropper, also provides a simpler argument for the optimality
of opportunistic transmission studied in [14], [19].
D. Gaussian Channels
Theorem 2 can be extended to the case of Gaussian parallel channels. Let σ2pij denote the noise variance
of the strongest user on channel j. Then the secrecy-sum-capacity is given by
Csum,GaussianK,M (P ) = max
(P1,P2,...PM )
M∑
j=1
{
1
2
log
(
1 +
Pj
σ2pij
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
Pj
σ2ej
)}+
(38)
where the maximization is over all power allocations satisfying
∑M
j=1 Pj ≤ P . The achievability follows
by using independent Gaussian wiretap codebooks on each channel and only considering the strongest
user on each channel. For the upper bound we have to show that Gaussian inputs are optimal in the
capacity expression in Theorem 2. The justifications are the same as in the common message case in
Section III-F.
V. FADING CHANNELS
The second part of this paper considers wireless fading channels. The case of one receiver and one
eavesdropper has been recently studied in a number of recent works [1], [10], [12], [15]–[17]. The proposed
schemes adapt the transmission power and/or rate depending on the instantaneous channel conditions. The
time varying nature of the fading channel enables secure transmission even when the eavesdropper has
an average channel stronger than that of the intended receiver.
To the best of our knowledge, the above works do not consider secure transmission to multiple receivers
in a wireless fading environment. We first consider the case when a common message has to be delivered to
a set of intended receivers. Next, we consider the case when each receiver obtains an independent message.
For this setting, we present a scheme based on multiuser diversity that achieves the sum capacity in the
limit of a large number of receivers.
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A. Channel Model
A block fading channel model for a system with one sender, K receivers, and one eavesdropper is of
the form
yi(t) = hi(t)x(t) + zi(t), i ∈ {1, 2, . . .K, e}, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . n} (39)
where i denotes the index of the receiver and t denotes the time index. The vectors zi,x,yi are T
dimensional complex valued vectors, where T denotes the coherence period of the channel. The channel
coefficients hi(t) are constant over a block of T symbols and change independently over the blocks.
In our analysis we focus only on the fast-fading scenario, i.e., T = 1. Using interleaved codebooks we
can realize the fast-fading case even when T > 1. The fast-fading channel model is of the form
yi(t) = hi(t)x(t) + zi(t), i ∈ {1, 2, . . .K, e}, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . n} (40)
where the hi(t)’s are sampled independently from CN (0, µi) distribution and all the noise variables are
sampled independently according to CN (0, 1). The input satisfies an average power constraint E[|X(t)|2] ≤
P .
Throughout, we assume the hi(t)’s to be revealed to the transmitter, the K intended receivers and the
eavesdropper in a causal manner. Implicitly we assume that there is an authenticated public feedback link
from the receivers to the transmitter. The channel coefficients of the eavesdropper {he(t)}1≤t≤n are only
known to the eavesdropper. The transmitter and the intended receivers only have statistical knowledge of
the eavesdropper’s channel gains.
Remark 8: In our setup we are assuming only one eavesdropper. Note however that the equivocation
term depends only on the statistics of He(t) and not on the realization of he(t). Accordingly the number
of eavesdroppers does not matter as long as they are statistically equivalent and do not collude.
VI. FADING CHANNELS: COMMON MESSAGE
Secure multicasting refers to the case when each receiver is only interested in a common message. The
transmitter exploits the channel knowledge of intended receivers to selectively broadcast the message to
these receivers, while the eavesdropper remains ignorant of the message. Note that without the secrecy
constraint, a non adaptive scheme such as the one that does a flat power allocation with no transmitter
CSI, appears to be not too far from the optimal. In contrast such schemes reveal the message to an
eavesdropper with a channel statistically equivalent to some intended receiver.
Perhaps, an interesting question is the scaling of the secrecy capacity with the number of receivers.
Does the capacity decay to zero with the number of receivers? Note that the scheme that consists in
sending information only when all the users have a strong channel performs poorly. Since the channel
gains across the users are independent, the achievable rate decays to zero exponentially in the number of
users.
An obvious upper bound is the secrecy capacity with a single receiver. Accordingly, the best we
hope for is that the common message secrecy-capacity is a constant, independent of the number of
intended receivers. In what follows, we present a coding scheme whose achievable rate is also a constant,
independent of the number of intended receivers. While our proposed scheme provides optimal scaling,
the precise value of the constant remains an open problem.
We now provide a formal definition of the common-message-secrecy-capacity.
Definition 5: A (n, 2nR) code for the channel consists of an encoding function which is a mapping from
the message w ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2nR} to transmitted symbols x(t) = ωt(w; ht1, ht2, . . . , htK) for t = 1, 2, . . . , n,
and a decoding function at each receiver Wˆi = φi(yni ; hn1 , hn2 , . . . , hnK) for each i = 1, 2, . . . , K. A rate R is
achievable if, for every ε > 0, there exists a length n code such that Pr(Wˆi 6= W ) ≤ ε for i = 1, 2, . . . , K
and such that
1
n
H (W | Hne , Hn1 , Hn2 , . . . , HnK) ≥ R− ε. (41)
The entropy term in (41) is conditioned on Hn1 , . . . , HnK as the channel gains of the K receivers are
assumed to be known to the eavesdropper.
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A. Main Results
Our main result is an achievable rate for the common-message-secrecy-rate to K receivers.
Theorem 3: An achievable common-message-secrecy-rate for the channel model (40) is given by
Rcommon(P ) = min
1≤i≤K
E
[{log(1 + |Hi|2P )− E[log(1 + |He|2P )]}+] (42)
If all the users are i.i.d. Rayleigh faded with E[|Hi|2] = 1, the following can be readily verified
lim
P→∞
Rcommon(P ) = 0.7089 bits/symbol (43)
Note that the achievable rate in (42) and (43) does not depend on the number of receivers. Accordingly,
we do not subscript the rate by K. That the capacity does not decay with the number of receivers is the
best scaling of the capacity with the number of receivers that one can expect.
The “interesting” part of our achievability rate (42) is the {·}+ inside the expectation. This is essentially
a consequence of the multiple codebook scheme we presented for the parallel channel case in Section III.
Our approach to establish the achievability of (42) is to decompose the fading channel into a set of
parallel channels and invoke Lemma 2 for the probabilistic extension of the parallel broadcast channel.
B. Achievability Scheme
First we consider the following probabilistic extension of the parallel broadcast channel [14]: At each
time, only one of the parallel channel operates and channel j is selected with a probability pj , independent
of all other times. Also suppose that there is a total power constraint P on the input. A straightforward
extension of Lemma 2 provides the following achievable rate
RcommonK,M (P )
∆
= max min
i∈{1,2,...,K}
M∑
j=1
pj{I(Uj; Yij)− I(Uj; Yej)}+, (44)
where U1, U2, . . . UM are auxiliary random variables and the maximum is over the product distribution
p(U1)p(U2) . . . p(UM) and the stochastic mappings Xj = fj(Uj) that satisfy
∑M
j=1 pjE[X
2
j ] ≤ P .
Next, we map the fading channel (40) into a set of parallel channels and invoke the achievable rate (44).
However, we need to resolve the technicality in that the fading channel has continuous valued fading
coefficients, while the rate expression in (44) is only for a finite number of parallel channels. Following [9],
our approach is to discretize the continuous valued coefficients and thus create parallel channels, one for
each quantized state. The number of parallel channels increases as the quantization becomes finer. In
what follows we only quantize the magnitude of the fading coefficients. The receiver can always rotate
the phase, so it plays no part.
We quantize the channel gains into one of the q values: A1 = 0 < A2 < . . . < Aq+1 = ∞. Receiver i
is in state l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q} at time t if Al ≤ |Hi(t)|2 < Al+1. When in state l, the receiver’s channel gain
is pessimistically discretized to
√
Al. Since there are K independent users, there are a total of M = qK
possible super-states, which we number as S1, S2, . . . , SM . Denote the quantized gain of user i in Sj by
the double subscript Sij . Let p(Sj) denote the probability of state Sj . Also let pi(Al) be the probability
that a user i is in state l i.e., pi(Al) =
∑M
k=1:Sik=Al
p(Sk). In super-state Sj , the channel of user i and the
eavesdropper are
yij(t) =
√
Sijx(t) + zi(t),
yel(t) = He(t)x(t) + ze(t).
By selecting Uj ∼ CN (0, P ) and Xj = Uj , the argument in the summation in (44) (with the eavesdropper
output (Yel, He)) is
{I(Uj; Yij)− I(Uj ; Yej, He)}+ = {I(Xj ; Yij)− I(Xj; Yej, He)}+
= {I(Xj ;
√
SijXj + Zi)− I(Xj;HeXj + Ze, He)}+
= {log(1 + SijP )− E[log(1 + |He|2P ]}+.
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Substituting in (44), we have that the following rate is achievable
RcommonQ (P ) = min
1≤i≤K
M∑
j=1
p(Sj){log(1 + SijP )− E[log(1 + |He|2P )]}+ (45)
= min
1≤i≤K
q∑
l=1
pi(Al){log(1 + AlP )− E[log(1 + |He|2P )]}+, (46)
where the second equality follows from rewriting the summation over the states of each individual user.
As q →∞, the above sum converges to
min
1≤i≤K
∫ ∞
0
{log(1 + xP )− E[log(1 + |He|2P )]}+pi(x)dx (47)
= min
1≤i≤K
E
[{log(1 + |Hi|2P )− E[log(1 + |He|2P )]}+] , (48)
yielding (42).
Remark 9: The scheme presented above requires qK codebooks, where q is the number of quantization
bins. A different decomposition which requires only 2K codebooks and provides the same achievable rate
is presented in Appendix III. This scheme can be implemented in practice with an outer erasure code and
an inner wiretap code, as discussed in [12].
VII. FADING CHANNELS: INDEPENDENT MESSAGES
We consider the case where each receiver wants an independent message. We will only focus on the sum
rate of the system. This scenario has been widely studied in conventional systems (i.e., without a secrecy
constraint) where the transmitter CSI provides dramatic gains (see e.g., [14], [19]). An “opportunistic
scheme” that selects the user with the largest instantaneous gain maximizes the sum-rate of the system.
The results in this section can be interpreted as an extension of opportunistic transmission in the presence
of eavesdroppers.
Definition 6: A (n, 2nR1, . . . , 2nRK) code consists of an encoding function from the messages w1, . . . , wK
with wi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2nRi} to transmitted symbols x(t) = ωt(w1, w2, . . . , wK; ht1, ht2, . . . , htK) for t =
1, 2, . . . , n, and a decoding function at each receiver Wˆi = φi(yni ; hn1 , hn2 , . . . , hnK). A rate tuple (R1, R2, . . . , RK)
is achievable with perfect secrecy if, for any ε > 0, there exists a length n code such that, for each
i = 1, 2, . . . , K, with Wi uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , 2nRi}, we have Pr(Wˆi 6= Wi) ≤ ε and
1
n
H
(
Wi
∣∣∣∣∣ W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,WK , Hne , Hn1 , . . . , HnK
)
≥ Ri − ε. (49)
The secrecy-sum-capacity is the supremum value of R1+R2+ . . .+RK among all achievable rate tuples.
A. Main Results
In the following, let Hmax denote the largest instantaneous channel gain among the K users. We first
upper and lower bound the secrecy-sum-capacity.
Lemma 6: For the channel model (40), the secrecy-sum-capacity is upper and lower bounded as
R+K(P ) = max
P (Hmax):E[P (Hmax)]≤P
E
[{log(1 + |Hmax|2P (Hmax))− log(1 + |He|2P (Hmax))}+] (50)
and
R−K(P ) = max
P (Hmax):E[P (Hmax)]≤P
E
[
log(1 + |Hmax|2P (Hmax))− log(1 + |He|2P (Hmax))
]
, (51)
respectively, where {v}+ denotes the max(0, v).
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The difference in our lower and upper bounds in (50) and (51) is that the {·}+ operator is inside the
expectation in our upper bound but not in the lower bound. Thus the “loss” with respect to the upper
bound occurs whenever |Hmax|2 ≤ |He|2. As the number of intended receivers grows this event happens
rarely and the gap between the upper and lower bounds vanishes. Formally we have
Theorem 4: The gap between our upper bound R+K(P ) and the lower bound R−K(P ) in Lemma 6
satisfies
R+K(P )− R−K(P ) ≤ Pr(|He|2 ≥ |Hmax|2)E
[
log
|He|2
|Hmax|2
∣∣∣∣∣ |He|2 ≥ |Hmax|2
]
. (52)
The bounds coincide in the limit K →∞ when all the channel gains are sampled from CN (0, 1).
CsumK (P ) = max
P (Hmax):E[P (Hmax)]≤P
E
[
log(1 + |Hmax|2P (Hmax))− log(1 + |He|2P (Hmax))
]
+ o(1), (53)
where o(1)→ 0 as K →∞.
The result of Theorem 4 shows that opportunistic transmission in conjunction with single user Gaussian
codebooks achieves the optimal sum secrecy-rate in the limit of large number of receivers.
Remark 10: To the best of our knowledge, the secrecy-sum-capacity for a finite number of receivers
has not been resolved for the fast fading model (40). When the coherence period is large enough so
that one can invoke random coding arguments in each period, it appears possible to extend the single
receiver result in [10] to determine the secrecy-sum-capacity for finite number of users. We elaborate this
connection later in the section VII-F.
Our upper and lower bounds do not coincide for a finite number of users. Nevertheless, the high SNR
limit provides a convenient operating regime for numerical evaluation of the bounds.
Corollary 3: We have
lim
P→∞
R+K(P ) = E
[{
log
|Hmax|2
|He|2
}+]
lim
P→∞
R−K(P ) = max
T≥0
Pr(|Hmax|2 ≥ T )E
[
log
|Hmax|2
|He|2
∣∣∣∣∣ |Hmax|2 ≥ T
]
.
(54)
B. Upper Bound in Lemma 6
Our proof technique is to introduce a single user genie-aided channel as in Section IV and then to upper
bound this single user channel. This upper bound on the genie aided channel is closely related to an upper
bound provided in [10] for the slow fading channel. We nevertheless provide a complete derivation in
Appendix IV.
C. Achievability in Lemma 6
The achievability scheme combines opportunistic transmission and a Gaussian wiretap code. At each
time, only the message of the user with the best instantaneous channel gain is selected for transmission.
As in Section VI-B, we quantize each receiver’s channel gain into q levels A1 = 0 < A2 < . . . < Aq ≤
Aq+1 =∞. Since the channel gains of the K users are independent, there are a total of M = qK different
super-states. These are denoted as S1, S2, . . . , SM . Each of the super-states denotes one parallel channel.
Note that on each parallel channel, the intended users have a Gaussian channel, while the eavesdropper
has a fading channel.
Our scheme transmits an independent message on each of the M parallel channels. Let Gj ∈ {A1, A2, . . . , Aq}
denote the gain of the strongest user on channel j. We use a Gaussian codebook with power P (Gj) on
channel j. The achievable rate on channel j is
Rj = I(Uj; Yj)− I(Uj ; Yej, Hej)
= log(1 +GjP (Gj))− E[log(1 + |He|2P (Gj))],
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where the second equality follows from our choice of Xj = Uj ∼ N (0, P (Gj)). The overall achievable
sum rate is given by
R−K(P ) =
M∑
j=1
Pr(Sj)Rj
=
M∑
j=1
Pr(Sj)(log(1 +GjP (Gj))− E[log(1 + |He|2P (Gj))])
=
q∑
l=1
Pr(Al)(log(1 + AlP (Al))− E[log(1 + |He|2P (Al))]),
where the last equality follows by using the fact that Gj ∈ {A1, A2, . . . , Aq} and rewriting the summation
over these indices. As q →∞,
R−K(P ) =
∫ ∞
0
(log(1 + aP (a))− E[log(1 + |He|2P (a))])p(a)da
= E
[
log(1 + |Hmax|2P (Hmax))− log(1 + |He|2P (Hmax))
]
,
(55)
which establishes (51).
D. Proof of Theorem 4
Let P ∗(Hmax) be the power allocation that maximizes R+K(P ) in (50). We have
R+K(P )− R−K(P ) ≤ E
[{log(1 + |Hmax|2P ∗(Hmax))− log(1 + |He|2P ∗(Hmax))}+]
− E [log(1 + |Hmax|2P (Hmax))− log(1 + |He|2P (Hmax))]
= Pr(|He|2 ≥ |Hmax|2)E
[
log
1 + |He|2P ∗(Hmax)
1 + |Hmax|2P ∗(Hmax)
∣∣∣∣∣ |He|2 ≥ |Hmax|2
]
≤ Pr(|He|2 ≥ |Hmax|2)E
[
log
|He|2
|Hmax|2
∣∣∣∣∣ |He|2 ≥ |Hmax|2
]
,
≤ 1
K + 1
2 log 2
where the first step follows substituting the bounds in 6, the third step follows from the fact that
log 1+|He|
2a
1+|Hmax|2a
is increasing in a for |He|2 ≥ |Hmax|2, and where the last step follows from Lemma 8
(proved in the Appendix V) and the fact that Pr(|He|2 ≥ |Hmax|2) = 1/(1 +K), since we assumed the
channel coefficients to be i.i.d.
E. Proof of Corollary 3
The upper bound follows from the simple identity, that for every P ≥ 0,{
log
1 + |Hmax|2P
1 + |He|2P
}+
≤
{
log
|Hmax|2
|He|2
}+
. (56)
For the lower bound, we use a two level power allocation strategy in (51). Fix a threshold T ≥ 0 and
let
P (Hmax) =
{
P0
∆
= P
Pr(|Hmax|2≥T )
|Hmax|2 ≥ T
0 otherwise.
(57)
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Fig. 4. Upper and Lower bounds in the High SNR limit (c.f. (54)) for the i.i.d. Rayleigh fading case. The y-axis plots the bounds in
nats/symbol while the x-axis plots the number of users.
This choice gives an achievable rate of
R−K(P ) = Pr(|Hmax|2 ≥ T )E
[
log
1 + |Hmax|2P0
1 + |He|2P0
∣∣∣∣∣ |Hmax|2 ≥ T
]
.
The argument inside the expectation is bounded by E[log |Hmax|
2
|He|2
] for all P0 > 0. Hence by the dominated
convergence theorem the limit P →∞ and the expectation can be interchanged. Accordingly we have
lim
P→∞
R−K(P ) = Pr(|Hmax|2 ≥ T )E
[
lim
P→∞
log
1 + |Hmax|2P0
1 + |He|2P0
∣∣∣∣∣ |Hmax|2 ≥ T
]
= Pr(|Hmax|2 ≥ T )E
[
log
|Hmax|2
|He|2
∣∣∣∣∣ |Hmax|2 ≥ T
]
which gives the desired result.
F. Discussion
Theorem 4 guarantees an arbitrarily small gap between upper and lower bounds on the sum-secrecy-
capacity, that holds for any fixed coherence period, provided the number of users is large enough.
In [10] two schemes are presented — a variable rate and a constant rate — for the case of a single
receiver in slow fading environment. Straightforward extensions of these schemes for multiple receivers
reveals the following. The variable rate scheme achieves the our upper bound in (50), whereas the constant
rate scheme achieve our lower bound in (51). Since these two expressions coincide as the number of
receivers tends to infinity, one deduces that the gains of variable rate schemes become negligible in this
limit.
Numerical Evaluation of the Upper and Lower Bounds: We plot the upper and lower bounds in the
high SNR limit in (54) in Fig. 4 for the case of i.i.d. Rayleigh fading. Note that the bounds are quite
close even for a moderate number of users.
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Colluding Attacks: We noted earlier that any number of statistically equivalent eavesdroppers does not
affect our capacity as long as they do not collude. If the eavesdroppers collude then they can combine
the received signals and attempt to decode the message. The upper and lower bounds in Lemma 6 can
be extended by replacing the term |He|2 with ||He||2, where He is the vector of channel gains of the
colluding eavesdroppers. One conclusion from these bounds is that the secrecy capacity is positive unless
the colluding eavesdropper population grows as logK.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A generalization of the wiretap channel to the case of parallel and fading channels with multiple
receivers is considered. We established the common-message-secrecy-capacity for the case of reversely
degraded parallel channels and provided upper and lower bounds for the general case. For independent
messages over parallel channels, the sum-secrecy capacity has been determined. For fading channels, we
examined a fast fading scenario when the transmitter knows the instantaneous channels of all the intended
receivers but not of the eavesdropper. Interestingly, the common-message-secrecy-capacity does not decay
to zero as the number of intended receiver grows. For the case of independent messages, it was shown
that an opportunistic scheme achieves the secrecy-sum-capacity in the limit of large number of users.
The protocols investigated in this paper relied on time diversity (for the common message) and multiuser
diversity (for independent messages) to enable secure communication. In situations where such forms of
diversity is not available, it is of interest to develop a formulation for secure transmission, analogous to
the outage formulation for slow fading channels. Secondly, the impact of multiple antennas on secure
transmission is far from being clear at this stage. While multiple antennas can theoretically provide
significant gains in throughput in the conventional systems, a theoretical analysis for the case of confidential
messages is naturally of great interest.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF FACT 2
Let T be a binary valued random variable such that: if T = 0 the induced distribution on X is p0(X),
i.e., p(Y, Z,X|T = 0) = p(Y, Z|X)p0(X), and if T = 1 the induced distribution on p(X) is p1(X)
i.e. p(Y, Z,X|T = 1) = p(Y, Z|X)p1(X). Note the Markov chain T → X → (Y, Z). To establish the
concavity of I(X ; Y |Z) in p(X) it suffices to show that
I(X ; Y |Z, T ) ≤ I(X ; Y |Z). (58)
The following chain of inequalities can be verified.
I(X ; Y |Z, T )− I(X ; Y |Z) = {I(X ; Y, Z|T )− I(X ;Z|T )} − {I(X ; Y, Z)− I(X ;Z)} (59)
= {I(X ; Y, Z|T )− I(X ;Z|T )} − {I(TX ; Y, Z)− I(TX ;Z)} (60)
= {I(X ; Y, Z|T )− I(TX ; Y, Z)} − {I(X ;Z|T )− I(TX ;Z)}
= I(T ;Z)− I(T ; Y, Z) = −I(T ; Y |Z) ≤ 0.
Equation (59) is a consequence of the chain rule for mutual information. Equation (60) follows from the
fact that T → X → (Y, Z) forms a Markov Chain, so that I(T ;Z|X) = I(T ; Y, Z|X) = 0.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Since there are Qj = 2nRej codewords per message bin Cj(W ) and each codeword is equally likely to
be selected
1
n
H(Unj |W ) = Rej
= I(Uj; Yej)− εF ,
(61)
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where the last equality follows from the definition of Rej in (18). Since the number of codewords in each
bin is less than 2n(I(Uj ;Yej)−εF ), we can select a code that satisfies Fano’s inequality
1
n
H(Unj |W,Y nej) ≤ γ ∆=
1
n
+ εF Rej . (62)
The equivocation at the eavesdropper can be lower bounded as
H(W |Y nej) = H(W,Unj |Y nej)−H(Unj |W,Y nej)
≥ H(Unj |Y nej)− nγ (63)
= H(Unj )− I(Unj ; Y nej)− nγ
= H(Unj ,W )− I(Unj ; Y nej)− nγ (64)
= H(W ) +H(Unj |W )− I(Unj ; Y nej)− nγ
≥ H(W ) + nI(Uj ; Yej)− I(Unj ; Y nej)− nγ − nεF . (65)
Here (63) follows from substituting (62), (64) from the fact that W is deterministic given Unj and (65)
follows by substituting (61). We now show that for a suitably chosen ε′ > 0
I(Unj ; Y
n
ej) ≤ nI(Uj ; Yej) + nε′. (66)
First note the following∣∣∣∣−1n log p(ynj )− nH(Yj)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ, ∀ynj ∈ T (Yj)∣∣∣∣−1n log p(ynj |unj )− nH(Yj|Uj)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ, ∀(ynj , unj ) ∈ T (Yj, Uj).
(67)
Let J be an indicator function which equals 1 if (ynj , unj ) ∈ T (Yj, Uj). From (67) we note that
I(Unj ; Y
n
j |J = 1) ≤ nI(Uj ; Yj) + 2nδ . (68)
Now we can upper bound I(Unj ; Y nj ) as
I(Unj ; Y
n
j ) ≤ I(Unj ; Y nj , J)
= I(Unj ; Y
n
j |J) + I(Unj ; J)
≤ I(Unj ; Y nj |J = 1) + I(Unj ; Y nj |J = 0)Pr(J = 0) +Hb(J) (69)
≤ nI(Uj ; Yj) + 2nδ + nε log |Y|+ 1, (70)
where (69) follows from the fact that I(Unj ; J) ≤ Hb(J), the binary entropy of J . The inequality (70)
follows from the fact that Hb(J) ≤ 1, Pr(J = 0) ≤ ε, I(Unj ; Y nj |J = 0) ≤ n log |Y|, and (68). We now
select
ε′ = 2δ + δ log |Y|+ 1
n
.
Combining (65) and (70) we have
1
n
I(W ; Y nej) ≤ ε′ + γ + εF
= 2δ + ε|Y|+ 2
n
+ εFRej + εF
∆
= ε′F
(71)
22
S4
Transmitter
|H1|
2 ≥ T
|H2|
2 ≥ T
S1
|H1|
2 ≥ T
|H2|
2 ≥ T|H2|
2
< T
|H1|
2
< T
Transmitter Transmitter Transmitter
|H1|
2
< T
|H2|
2
< T
S2 S3
Fig. 5. Decomposition of the two user system into four states. In the first state both users have channel gains above the threshold. In the
second state only user 1 has channel above the threshold while in the third state only user 2 has channel above the threshold. The fourth
state both users have channels below the threshold. In any state, a user is colored dark if the channel gain is below the threshold and shaded
if the channel gain is above the threshold.
APPENDIX III
ALTERNATE SCHEME FOR THEOREM 3
We present an alternate scheme for Theorem 3. For simplicity we focus on the case of two receivers.
The case of more than two receivers is analogous. Fix a threshold T > 0 and decompose the system
into four states as shown in Fig. 5. . The transmission happens over a block of length n and we classify
t = 1, 2, . . . , n as
S1 =
{
t ∈ {1, n} | |h1(t)|2 ≥ T, |h2(t)|2 ≥ T
}
S2 =
{
t ∈ {1, n} | |h1(t)|2 ≥ T, |h2(t)|2 < T
}
S3 =
{
t ∈ {1, n} | |h1(t)|2 < T, |h2(t)|2 ≥ T
}
S4 =
{
t ∈ {1, n} | |h1(t)|2 < T, |h2(t)|2 < T
}
.
(72)
The resulting channel is a probabilistic parallel channel with probabilities of the four channels as
p(S1) = Pr(|H1|2 ≥ T, |H2|2 ≥ T ), p(S2) = Pr(|H1|2 ≥ T, |H2|2 < T ), p(S3) = Pr(|H1|2 < T, |H2|2 ≥
T ) and p(S4) = Pr(|H1|2 < T, |H2|2 < T ). Also note that with Xj = Uj ∼ CN (0, P ) in the argument of
the summation in (44),
{I(Uj; Yij)− I(Uj; Yej)}+ =
{
0, if |Hi|2 ≤ T in Sj
E [log(1 + |Hi|2P )− log(1 + |He|2P ) | |Hi|2 ≥ T ] , if |Hi|2 > T in Sj .
(73)
Substituting these expressions in the achievable rate expression for the probabilistic parallel channel (44)
we get
Rcommon(P ) = max
T>0
min
1≤i≤2
Pr(|Hi|2 ≥ T )E
[
log(1 + |Hi|2P )− log(1 + |He|2P )
∣∣∣∣∣ |Hi|2 ≥ T
]
= max
T>0
min
1≤i≤2
∫ ∞
T
(log(1 + xP )− E[log(1 + |He|2P ])pi(x)dx
≥ min
1≤i≤2
∫ ∞
T ∗
(log(1 + xP )− E[log(1 + |He|2P ])pi(x)dx (74)
= min
1≤i≤2
∫ ∞
0
{log(1 + xP )−E[log(1 + |He|2P )]}+pi(x)dx
= min
1≤i≤2
E
[{log(1 + |Hi|2P )−E[log(1 + |He|2P )]}+] , (75)
where T ∗ in (74) is the solution to log(1 + xP )−E[log(1 + |He|2P ] = 0. (The optimality of T ∗ follows
from the fact that pi(x) ≥ 0 and hence the integral is maximized by keeping all terms which are positive
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and discarding the negative terms, however this is not necessary to note as this is an achievable scheme.)
Note that (75) coincides with the achievable rate in Theorem 3 for the case of K = 2 users. As remarked
earlier, this scheme straightforwardly generalizes to more than two receivers. With K receivers we will
have a total of 2K states, where each state specifies the subset of users that are above the threshold T ∗.
APPENDIX IV
PROOF OF THE UPPER BOUND IN LEMMA 6
Consider the channel with one receiver and one eavesdropper.
Y (t) = Hmax(t)X(t) + Z(t)
Ye(t) = He(t)X(t) + Ze(t).
(76)
Along the lines of Lemma 4 in Section IV-B one deduces that the sum-secrecy-capacity of the channel (40)
is upper bounded by the secrecy capacity of the genie-aided-channel (76). It remains to show that an upper
bound on the secrecy capacity of this channel is
R+(P ) = max
P (Hmax):E[P (Hmax)]≤P
E
[{log(1 + |Hmax|2P (Hmax))− log(1 + |He|2P (Hmax))}+] . (77)
In what follows we will denote the eavesdropper’s channel output by Yˆe(t) = (Ye(t), He(t)) and
optimistically assume that the sequence Hnmax is known to the sender and the receiver non-causally.
The joint distribution of the noise variables (Z(t), Ze(t)) is selected to be such that if |He(t)| ≤ |Hmax(t)|
we have X(t)→ Y (t)→ Ye(t), otherwise we have X(t)→ Ye(t)→ Y (t).
Suppose for this channel and the sequence Hnmax, there is a sequence of (n, 2nR) codes that achieve
perfect secrecy in Definition 6. Following the derivation of the upper bound Theorem 2, we have
nR ≤ I(W ; Y n|Hnmax)− I(W ; Yˆ ne |Hnmax) + nε
≤ I(W ; Y n, Yˆen|Hnmax)− I(W ; Yˆ ne |Hnmax) + nε
= I(W ; Y n|Hnmax, Yˆ ne ) + nε
≤ I(Xn; Y n|Hnmax, Yˆ ne ) + nε (78)
≤
n∑
t=1
I(X(t); Y (t)|Hmax(t), Yˆe(t)) + nε (79)
where (78) follows from the fact that W → (Xn, Yˆ ne )→ Y n follows a Markov chain and (79) from the
fact that the channel is memoryless.
Now let Hn be the set of all fades that have been realized, i.e.,
Hn = {γ | ∃t ∈ [1, n], Hmax(t) = γ} , (80)
let Nγ denote the number of times in the interval [0, n] that the channel has fade γ, and let Sγ denote the
time indices corresponding to a fade γ, i.e.,
Sγ =
{
t | 1 ≤ t ≤ n, |Hmax(t)|2 = γ
}
γ ∈ Hn.
Letting the average transmitted power at time t ∈ Sγ be denoted as P nγ (t) we have
P n(t)
∆
= E[|X(t)|2] t ∈ Sγ (81)
where the expectation is over the set of transmitted messages and any stochastic mapping used by the
encoder. Let P¯ nγ denote the average power transmitted with fade level γ
P¯ nγ =
{
1
Nγ
∑
t∈Sγ
P n(t), γ ∈ Hn
0 otherwise
(82)
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We will need the following Lemma, which follows from the capacity for the Gaussian wiretap chan-
nel [13].
Lemma 7: Let (X, Y, Yˆe) be random variables such that Y =
√
γX+Zr and Ye =
√
µX+Zr. Suppose
that Zr ∼ CN (0, 1) and Ze ∼ CN (0, 1) and that the joint distribution of (Zr, Ze) satisfies X → Y → Ye
if |µ| ≤ |γ| and X → Ye → Y otherwise. Then we have
max
p(X),E[|X|2]≤P¯
I(X ; Y |Ye) = log(1 + γP¯ )− log(1 + min(γ, µ)P¯ ) . (83)
Now we have
n∑
t=1
I
(
X(t); Y (t)
∣∣∣∣∣ Hmax(t), Yˆe(t)
)
=
∑
γ0∈Hn
∑
t∈Sγ0
I
(
X(t); Y (t) |
∣∣∣∣∣ Hmax(t)|2 = γ0, Yˆe(t)
)
(84)
=
∑
γ0∈Hn
∑
t∈Sγ0
{∫ ∞
µ=0
I
(
X(t); Y (t)
∣∣∣∣∣ |Hmax(t)|2 = γ0, Ye(t), |He(t)|2 = µ
)
pµdµ
}
(85)
≤
∑
γ0∈Hn
∑
t∈Sγ0
{∫ ∞
µ=0
(log(1 + γ0P
n(t))− log(1 + min(γ0, µ)P n(t)))pµdµ
}
(86)
≤
∑
γ0∈Hn
∑
t∈Sγ0
(log(1 + γ0P
n(t))−Eµ[log(1 + min(γ0, µ)P n(t)))]
≤
∑
γ0∈Hn
Nγ0(log(1 + γ0P¯
n
γ0
)− Eµ[log(1 + min(γ0, µ)P¯ nγ0)]), (87)
where (84) follows by re-writing the summation over the set Hn, (85) follows from the independence of
He(t) and Hmax(t), (86) follows from Lemma 7, and (87) is justified from the fact that for any γ0 > 0,
the expression Ψγ0(y) = log(1+ γ0y)−E[log(1+min(γ0, µ)y)] is a concave function in y for y ≥ 0, i.e.,
∑
t∈Sγ0
Ψ(P nγ0(t)) ≤ Nγ0Ψ

 1
Nγ0
∑
t∈Sγ0
P nγ0(t)

 = Nγ0Ψ(P¯ nγ0).
Combining (79) and (87) we get
R ≤ ε+
∑
γ0∈Hn
log(1 + γ0P¯
n
γ0
)−Eµ[log(1 + min(γ0, µ)P¯ nγ0)]
Nγ0
n
. (88)
Now note that, for each n, we have
∫∞
γ=0
P¯ nγ0dγ ≤ P . Thus for each n, the set of points P¯ nγ0 , indexed by
γ0, lie in a compact space. For this sequence of points, there exists a convergent subsequence P¯ niγ0 that
converges to some power allocation P¯γ0 as ni → ∞. Taking limit along the converging subsequence of
the upper bound on the rate (88)
R ≤
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + γP¯γ)− E[log(1 + min(γ, µ)P¯γ)]pγdγ
= E[log(1 + γP¯γ)− log(1 + min(γ, µ)P¯γ)],
and this completes the proof of the upper bound.
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APPENDIX V
HELPER LEMMA IN THE PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Lemma 8: Let H1, H2, . . . , HK , He be i.i.d. unit mean exponentials. For K ≥ 2, we have
E
[
log
|He|2
|Hmax|2
∣∣∣∣∣ |He|2 ≥ |Hmax|2
]
≤ 2 log 2
First note the following.
Fact 3 ( [4]): Let V1, V2, . . . , VK , VK+1 be i.i.d. exponential random variables with mean λ and Vmax(K + 1)
denotes the largest of these exponential and Vmax(K) the second largest. The joint distribution of (Vmax(K), Vmax(K + 1))
satisfies
Vmax(K + 1) = Vmax(K) + Y, (89)
where Y is an exponential random variable with mean λ and is independent of Vmax(K)
Proof: We have
E
[
log
|He|2
|Hmax|2
∣∣∣∣∣ |He|2 ≥ |Hmax|2
]
= E
[
log
|Hmax|2 + Y
|Hmax|2
]
(90)
≤ E
[
Y
|Hmax|2
]
(91)
= E[Y ]E
[
1
|Hmax|2
]
(92)
= E
[
1
|Hmax|2
]
(93)
where (91) follows from the identity log(1 + x) ≤ x for x > 0, (92) follows from the independence of Y
and Hmax, and (93) from the fact that E[Y ] = 1. Since |Hmax|2 ≥ max(|H1|2, |H2|2) we obtain
E
[
1
|Hmax|2
]
≤ E
[
1
max(|H1|2, |H2|2)
]
≤ 2 log 2.
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